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BOOK REVIEW
GAMBLING AND THE LAW, by I. Nelson Rose. Hollywood,
CA: Gambling Times Incorporated. 1986. Pp. xvii + 308.
Hard Cover. $19.95.
Reviewed by Richard Gruner*
Legalized gambling has grown dramatically in recent decades.'
Legal gambling now thrives in such diverse settings as licensed casi-
nos, state lotteries, off-track betting establishments, commercial card
clubs and bingo parlors on Indian reservations. In 1984, gamblers'
losses in commercial gambling establishments (and, hence, the gross
income of those establishments from gambling activities) totaled
$13.6 billion, a 600% increase during the previous 11 years." Obvi-
© 1987 by Richard Gruner
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law;
B.S., 1975, California Institute of Technology; J.D., 1978, University of Southern California
Law Center; LL.M., 1982, Columbia University School of Law.
1. This growth can be measured in a variety of ways. Millions of players today partici-
pate in gambling activities that were illegal only a few years ago. For example, in Atlantic
City, New Jersey, where no casinos existed until 1978, 384,358 bus trips delivered 12.2 mil-
lion players to casinos in 1984. I. NELSON ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 7 (1986) [herein-
after ROsE].
Millions of other players bet on the lotteries sponsored by a growing number of states. In
1964, New Hampshire voters adopted the first state lottery of this century. Today, 22 states
operate lotteries and another 24 states are considering adopting one. Insight, March 17, 1986,
at 6-8.
Other forms of commercial gambling are also expanding. Nine states have authorized
commercial card rooms, while five states permit betting on jai alai games. Indian-operated
bingo parlors (some offering jackpots as large as $50,000) are open in at least five states.
Parimutuel betting, having already experienced a growth spurt in the 1930's and 1940's, has
continued to prosper. Thirty-three states now permit horse race gambling, with 22 of them
allowing betting away from the race site. See ROSE, supra, at 3-4.
2. RosE, supra note 1, at 6. Significant portions of these revenues were realized in the
following industry segments: casinos - $5.0 billion; state lotteries - $4.1 billion; parimutuel
betting - $3.0 billion;, charity bingo - $818 million; other charity gambling - $53 million.
Gambling and Wagering Business, July, 1985, at 24 & August, 1985, at 1.
Viewed either as the gross income of a thriving industry or as the economic losses suffered
by gamblers, these sums demonstrate the current social importance of legalized gambling.
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ously, the total amounts bet in these establishments were much
greater.3
The growth of legalized gambling has prompted development of
a new body of gambling law. In a number of states, recently adopted
constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions have expanded the
scope of legal gambling activities." In addition, traditional legal stan-
dards in fields such as contract and constitutional law have been
newly interpreted to resolve special issues raised by gambling-related
disputes. 5
Gambling and the Law6 by Professor I. Nelson Rose is the first
comprehensive survey of this new body of gambling law.7 Rose treats
3. The amount of play per dollar lost to the house varies with the type of gambling
involved. For example, at Atlantic City blackjack tables, players purchased $6.21 worth of
chips for each dollar lost to the house in 1984. By contrast, the corresponding figure for nickel
slot machines was $6.90 bet per dollar lost. These figures are simply the inverse of the casino
"win" percentages of 16.1% and 14.5% for these two games. See Casino Chronicles, Feb. 4, 11,
19, & March 4, 1985.
Overall, one estimate places the total amount bet on legal gambling in the United States
during 1984 at $147 billion. See Gambling & Wagering Business, July, 1985, at 24 & Au-
gust, 1985, at 1.
4. In many instances, limited forms of gambling have been legalized by making small
amendments to comprehensive gambling prohibitions previously adopted. For example, the
California Constitution has for many years prohibited the legislature from authorizing lotter-
ies. This prohibition has been softened by three constitutional amendments: first, to allow
horse race betting, second, to allow charity bingo, and third, to establish the California State
lottery. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19.
5. One clear example of this common law process at work involves the judicial develop-
ment of special standards for the enforceability of gambling debts. In many states (including,
surprisingly, Nevada), courts have refused to enforce contracts involving gambling debts on the
ground that such enforcement would be against public policy. See, e.g., Dennis v. Weaver, 103
Ga. App. 829, 121 S.E.2d 190 (1961); Corbin v. O'Keefe, 87 Nev. 189, 484 P.2d 566 (1971).
However, as the clarity of public policy against gambling diminishes with the legalization of
certain types of gambling such as lotteries or charity bingo, courts are having more difficultly
determining if gambling debts are enforceable. See, e.g., Caribe Hilton Hotel v. Toland, 63
N.J. 301, 307 A.2d 85 (1973).
6. ROSE, supra note 1.
7. A number of prior works have addressed aspects of gambling law. For a wide ranging
examination of gambling law policy and proposals for improvement of gambling laws, see
COMM'N ON THE REVIEW OF THE NAT'L POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN
AMERICA (1976). The history of gambling law is reviewed in U.S. Dept. of Justice, NAT'L
INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, The Development of the Law of Gambling 1776-1976
(1977); Blakey & Kurland, The Development of the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL
L. REV. 923 (1978). The regulation of casino gambling is analyzed in J. GOODWIN, GAM-
BLING CONTROL LAW (1985); J. SKOLNICK, HOUSE OF CARDS (1978) [hereinafter SKOL-
NICK]; Rose, The Legalization and Control of Casino Gambling, FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 245
(1979). The leading work on the influence of organized crime on gambling enterprises is R.
KING, GAMBLING AND ORGANIZED CRIME (1969). A variety of gambling law issues are ad-
dressed in New Jersey Casino Gaming Symposium, 6 SETON HAL.L L. J. 1 (1982); Symposium:
Legal Aspects of Public Gaming, 12 CONN. L. REV. 661 (1980).
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gambling law as a distinct regulatory field, involving legal issues that
are not only technically complex, but philosophically distinct from
those in other legal areas.8 In describing the new legal and social
issues surrounding legalized gambling, Rose has produced a remark-
ably readable text that will be of great interest to judges, lawyers
and officials applying gambling laws, as well as to any person con-
cerned about governmental control over gambling.
I. THE NEED TO STUDY GAMBLING LAW
The significance of Rose's work turns in part on the importance
of gambling law itself. Greater attention to gambling law seems jus-
tified for several reasons. First, as previously mentioned, commercial
gambling enterprises have attained enormous economic significance
as service providers, as employers and as businesses.9 Second, large
scale gambling operations involve opportunities for massive fraud or
theft due to the handling of large quantities of cash in those opera-
tions."0 Third, even where gambling activities are legal, they may be
8. One leading analyst has summarized the unusual philosophical dilemmas underlying
gambling law as follows:
When a deviant social activity, formerly outlawed because it was regarded as
immoral, becomes legal, however restricted, does it lose its stigma through legal-
ization? Is the ill repute of the activity reduced by its association with legal
authorities who have declared it to be within the realm of acceptable conduct?
Or, does the moral obloquy attaching to the activity discredit the legalizers? The
movement to decriminalize deviance thus carries in its weight two associated sets
of problems: the problem of how to develop and organize legal institutions to
assess, define, and manage the economics of an ill-reputed activity through the
use of state power; and the problem of how to insulate the controllers from the
stigma associated with the activity.
SKOLNICK, supra note 7, at 31.
9. Ironically, the spectacular initial success of many gambling enterprises may ulti-
mately lead to their demise. Professor Rose points out that when a new form of gambling is
legalized, initial player enthusiasm and limited industry competition often produce impressive
net proceeds. These proceeds attract competition from other states or establishments for subse-
quent gaming dollars. Once the novelty wears off and more entities attempt to promote gam-
bling with diminishing success, net proceeds necessarily drop. Several state lotteries and li-
censed gambling establishments have experienced this revenue drop. See ROSE, supra note 1,
at 13-17.
10. Gambling enterprises offer many opportunities for hidden "skimming" of funds,
both in gambling activities themselves and in the distribution of enterprise profits. An official
with New Jersey Casino Control Commission gave the following description of the risks of
theft in casino operations and the corresponding problems of internal casino financial control:
Unlike other enterprises, two elements join to make the effective control of a
casino's internal operation problematical and complex. First, a casino contains a
vast amount of liquid assets in the form of cash and gaming chips which are
very attractive and susceptible to misappropriation. Second, these liquid assets
remain uncounted and unrecorded as the gaming activity takes place. Casinos
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
used to hide other illegal behavior by providing a ready means to
conceal or "launder" criminal gains." Fourth, because typically in-
volves plenary regulatory powers, [gambling industry regulation]
often constitutes a valuable laboratory for testing the effectiveness of
novel regulatory techniques." Finally, gambling-based disputes raise
tough questions about how legal standards applicable to normal so-
cial activities should be modified when applied to morally disfavored
activities like gambling.' 8
Given such substantial reasons to study -gambling law, why
have so few legal scholars examined this field?' 4 Undoubtedly, much
are unique because millions of dollars are continually changing hands among
thousands of people on the casino floor without any record being made of how
much money is exchanged, how many people are involved, or who those individ-
uals are. . . . It is this peculiarity that makes a casino especially vulnerable and
creates substantial problems in accurately accounting for a casino's revenue, in
effectively auditing casino operations, and in detecting and preventing theft by
casino management, employees, and patrons.
Santaniello, Casino Gambling: The Elements Of Effective Control, 6 SETON HALL L. J. 23,
23-24 (1982). See also SKOLNICK, supra note 7, at 67-83, 127-32.
11. Businesses with high cash flows like gambling casinos are attractive objects of organ-
ized crime control:
Certain legitimate business are of interest to organized crime groups and indi-
viduals. . . . [Blusiness enterprises heretofore selected by organized crime have
been so targeted because of the ability to funnel funds (i.e., launder illegally
obtained money) through such largely cash businesses. In addition, organized
crime members can obtain an air of respectability and employability through
such legitimate employment and also obtain thereby a means of reporting a por-
tion of their illegally derived income for tax purposes.
D. HERBET & H. TRITT, CORPORATIONS OF CORRUPTION 56 (1984).
12. Casino regulation can serve a variety of purposes, including "preventing corruption
in all its forms, assuring the competence of key casino operatives, maintaining the flow of tax
dollars and encouraging other revenue raising and economic growth while limiting adverse side
effects and expanding the options available to citizens .. " Rose, The Legalization and
Control of Casino Gambling, 8 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 245, 267-68 (1980). Regulatory tech-
niques furthering these goals will be of interest to regulators having similar aims in other
fields.
As an example of gambling regulation as a testing ground, the author has previously
examined the merits of executive disqualification as a corporate control technique based on the
experience of the New Jersey Casino Control Commission in applying this technique for cor-
porate casino licensing. See Gruner, Banished From the Boardwalk. The Control of Corporate
Casino Operations Through Executive Disqualification, 16 RUTGC ERS L.J. 759 (1985).
13. The answers to these questions are significant in other legal areas which, like gov-
ernment control of gambling, involve legal regulation of morally controversial activities. Gam-
bling law shares many similarities with legal standards in areas like liquor control or mari-
juana possession where behavior formerly outlawed as "immoral" has been legalized. For a
summary of the issues raised by this "legalization of deviance," see SKOLNICK, supra note 7, at
24-32.
14. While formal scholarship in this field is still rare, there are clear signs of growing
interest in gambling law among legal academics and practitioners. The high level of interest in
this field is reflected in the success of the six National Conferences on Gambling and Risk
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of this neglect arose during the long period of economic insignifi-
cance of legalized gambling between the widespread lottery scandals
of the 1890's and the renewed interest in state sanctioned gambling
in the 1960's. The lack of attention may also have stemmed from the
complexities of gambling itself - that is, the need to fully under-
stand gambling techniques before being able to effectively study legal
control of those techniques.1
Another possible reason for the paucity of gambling law studies
is the multiplicity of legal disciplines in which gambling problems
may arise. In any given substantive area, gambling-related disputes
may form but a small fraction of legal controversies and, therefore,
appear not to merit extensive study. Only by taking a broader view
encompassing a variety of substantive fields can an observer appreci-
ate the factual and philosophical similarities that justify a coordi-
nated study. Yet, the need for at least some expertise in each of the
applicable substantive fields limits the number of persons who can
successfully undertake this study.
II. THE MORAL ENVIRONMENT
The moral disrepute of gambling among large segments of the
public has played a key role in shaping the resolution of gambling
law controversies by courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies.1"
Gambling has often been described as an example of social pathol-
ogy, 17 but there is little agreement about why gambling is immoral.
For some, the evil of gambling lies in its misleading promise of easy
money that distracts persons from more productive endeavors.1" To
Taking held to date, in the organization of the International Association of Gaming Attorneys
in 1980, and in the more recent formation of a Gaming Law Committee in the American Bar
Association's General Practice Section. See RosE, supra note 1, at 294, 297.
15. For example, one on-going legal dispute in California turns on whether "Texas
hold'em poker" is a form of "stud-horse poker" and, hence, prohibited under California stat-
utes. The resolution of this dispute clearly turns on substantial technical knowledge of the
characteristics of these obscure poker variants. See ROSE, supra, note 1, at 33-42.
16. Of course, public moral attitudes are influenced by actions of the state, as well as the
reverse. The legalization of various forms of gambling may make gambling newly "respecta-
ble," particularly where the state itself operates and promotes gambling activities. Thus, legali-
zation may make gambling less morally distasteful, at least until a particular scandal again
places it in disrepute. See Rose, The Legalization and Control of Casino Gambling, 8 FORD-
HAM URBAN L.J. 245, 264-65 (1980).
17. One leading legal commentator to so characterize gambling was Jeremy Bentham,
who felt that gambling was pathologic because it had a tendency to reduce gambler's net hap-
piness. See J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, 102-06 (1876).
18. Even where gambling is legal, its inconsistency with the puritan work ethic may
lead to regulatory restrictions. For example, the British Gaming Board sets limits on the
amount that can be won in bingo games because the board believes there is something indecent
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others, gambling is pathological because it sometimes becomes com-
pulsive, displacing all other life activities.1 9 Yet others complain of
gambling activities (particularly lotteries) because they promote neg-
ative income distribution - i.e., since the poor participate at higher
rates, their economic well being is reduced far more by gambling
than that of the rich.20 Still further objections revolve around the
unsavory types of persons, - organized crime figures, prostitutes,
thieves and other criminals - reputedly associated with gambling
establishments.'
Upon further examination, the immorality of gambling seems
less clear. Arguably, gambling is the counterpart of insurance, with
the payoff occurring upon a "win" rather than a "casualty loss."
'
"
2
about a person gaining a larger reward based on chance alone. See SKOLNICK, supra note 7, at
20.
Ironically, gambling may be equally inconsistent with Marxist ethics, since it can serve as
an "opiate of the masses," distracting workers from the struggles against class oppression. See
Halliday & Fuller, Gambling: A Secular "Religion" for the Obsessional Neurotic, The Psy-
chology of Gambling 1 (Halliday & Fuller eds. 1974); SKOLNICK, supra note 7, at 20.
19. See, e.g., Weinstein & Deitch, The Impact of Legalized Gambling: The Socioeco-
nomic Consequences of Lotteries and Off-track Betting, 13 Soc'v, at 86-87 (1975). One 1975
estimate placed the number of compulsive gamblers in the United States at 6 million. Id.
However, the criteria used in making this estimate have been criticized as too inclusive. See
SKOLNICK, supra note 7, at 20-21.
Other studies have verified the positive correlation between gambling availability and se-
vere personality disorders. See, e.g., COMM'N ON THE REVIEW OF THE NAT'L POLICY To-
WARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN AMERICA 74 (1976) (percentage of compulsive gamblers,
suicides, and alcoholics in Nevada found to be the highest in the United States).
20. Among the various types of legal gambling available in the early 1970's, only Ne-
vada casino gambling was not regressive - all other forms of gambling imposed proportion-
ately greater losses on poor players than rich ones. The progressive impact of Nevada casino
gambling was apparently the result of the physical isolation of the Nevada casino centers -
most casino patrons were out-of-towners who had the resources to come to Nevada casinos.
When only local casino players were studied, Nevada casino gambling was also found to be
highly regressive. See COMM'N ON THE REVIEW OF THE NAT'L POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING,
GAMBLING IN AMERICA 61, 98 (1976); Rose, The Legalization and Control of Casino Gam-
bling, 8 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 245, 260-61 (1979). Since it is easily available to lower in-
come players through inexpensive bus tours, Atlantic City casino gambling is probably much
more regressive than its Nevada counterpart.
21. Some of these associations and the difficulties Nevada authorities have had in elimi-
nating them are described in SKOLNICK, supra note 7, at 35-51, 67-98, 101-33.
22. See id. at 16 (provided that small bets at long odds are involved, "the logic of gam-
bling and insurance are strikingly similar").
Obviously, gambling and insurance contracts serve substantially different social ends. In-
surance permits persons to plan their activities without concern over certain risks associated
with those activities. On the other hand, gambling is valuable because it entertains players.
Arguably, the planning advantages of insurance have a greater social value than the en-
tertainment provided by gambling, and this difference in social ends may justify some of the
disparity in the legal treatment of these practices. However, most of this disparity probably
stems from the unusual dangers associated with gambling (such as theft or the involvement of
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To the extent that players in commercial establishments tend to lose
some of their money, if they enjoy the gambling process and environ-
ment, their losses are merely a fee paid for entertainment, much like
the admission price of a movie or a Broadway show. Even if viewed
as an activity with a high risk of monetary loss, gambling exposes its
participants to arguably less significant risks than other respectable
forms of entertainment such as skiing, skydiving, or scuba diving.
In a legal context, gambling's questionable morality raises some
fascinating problems. Sometimes, this moral character is reflected di-
rectly in legal rulings. Under conflicts law, for example, a foreign
state's laws governing gambling need not be given full effect where
to do so would violate the public policy of the state seeking
enforcement.23
Other times, official views on the immorality of gambling are
reflected in strained interpretations of legal standards which disfavor
certain gambling activities. Examples of such strained interpretations
include the California Attorney General's conclusion that a statutory
restriction on a particular type of stud poker prohibits all forms of
stud poker24 and the Federal Communications Commission's view
that statutory prohibitions on the broadcast advertising of lotteries
bar all advertising of gambling activities.2 1
III. THE RANGE OF GAMBLING LAW
Professor Rose's new work illustrates the remarkable range of
legal issues stemming from legalized gambling. Just a few of the
legal problems examined by Rose include statutory drafting ambigu-
ities involved in defining gambling games and activities for purposes
of selectively legalizing them,2 6 constitutional free speech issues re-
garding the advertising of gambling activities,27 federalism issues as-
sociated with state control over commercial gambling on federal In-
dian reservations,28 tax law questions regarding the tax treatment
and reporting of gambling winnings,2" and the effectiveness of con-
organized crime), rather than the lesser merit of the ends of gambling. Cf. J. BE.NTHAM, THE
THEORY OF LE;IStATION 102-06 (1876) (gambling warrants prohibition because of its ten-
dency to reduce player happiness over time, while insurance deserves protection as a rational
social invention).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 51-55.
24. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 39-43.
26. RosE, supra note 1, at 33-42.
27. Id. at 55-67.
28. Id. at 210-12.
29. Id. at 109-41, 221-42.
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trolling organized crime influence through elaborate licensing
schemes for casino operators and their employees."0 The growing im-
portance of these issues was reflected in the Supreme Court's resolu-
tion of its first four gambling law cases during the past year."
A. Statutory Poker In California
Rose's discussion of a major ongoing dispute over the types of
poker prohibited under California law illustrates both his emphasis
on legal history and his ability to link gambling law discussions to
broader legal principles. California statutes specifically prohibit the
playing of "stud-horse poker," as well as several other enumerated
card games.3 2 Rose explains that this prohibition was imposed by the
legislature to combat a stud-horse poker craze in San Francisco dur-
ing the 1880's, in which poker rooms for playing the game flourished
in that city.
Unfortunately, the legislature failed to define the characteristics
of stud-horse poker, particularly the minimum features a card game
must have to fall within this prohibition. Given that the game has
not been played since the late 1800's (at least not under the name
"stud-horse poker"), historical evidence regarding stud-horse poker
is limited. However, the little evidence available suggests that stud-
horse poker was a particular variant of 5-card stud poker.
California card sharks, aware that forms of poker other than
stud-horse poker were not prohibited, simply shifted to 4-card stud
poker, also known as "hokey-pokey." 33 Consequently, in 1891, Cali-
30. Id. at 178-93.
31. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987) (state
control over Indian-operated bingo); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger, 107 S.
Ct. 980 (1987) (tax treatment of individual gambling losses); Posadas de Puerto Rico Associ-
ates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986) (commercial speech protections for
gambling advertising); United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2092 (1986) (tax
treatment of casino slot machine income).
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 330 (West Supp. 1986). The relevant provisions are as
follows:
Every person who deals, plays or carries on . . . any game of faro, monte,
roulette, lansquenet, rouge-et-noir, rondo, tan, fan-tan, stud-horse poker, seven-
and-a-half, twenty-one, hokey-pokey, or any banking or percentage game
played with cards, dice or any device, for money, checks, credit or other repre-
sentative of value, and every person who plays or bets at or against any of said
prohibited games is guilty of a misdemeanor. . ..
Id. This is an exclusive list of prohibited gambling activities - i.e., the games listed are not
* merely examples of a broader group of prohibited gambling techniques. See In re Hubbard, 62
Cal. 2d 119, 126, 396 P.2d 809, 813, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 397 (1964).
33. RosE, supra note 1, at 36, 41. The minimal changes made by 19th century card
players to avoid the specific prohibitions of California's gambling statute are akin to more
[Vol. 27
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fornia legislators (presumably with a collective chuckle) enacted stat-
utory language which prohibited citizens from playing "hokey-
pokey."
3' 4
More recently, the California Attorney General has interpreted
the statutory prohibition of stud-horse poker as barring stud poker
generally. 5 Since draw poker is not prohibited, this interpretation
leads to some peculiar legal distinctions. For example, California
card players comply with the law so long as their poker games in-
volve a draw from the deck and cards dealt face down, but players
break the law when they eliminate the draw and deal stud poker -
e.g., 5-card stud with one card down, four cards up, and no draw.
Subtle distinctions concerning card games make little difference
to the individual player because criminal penalties for stud poker
playing are seldom enforced against private players. However, since
California State law permits local governments to license commercial
card clubs for the playing of any card game not specifically prohib-
ited by state law,"6 California's statutory distinction between stud
poker and draw poker is of vital importance to card club operators
and local regulators. 7
Rose also examines the bizarre legal battle currently underway
recent efforts by illicit drug manufacturers to create "designer" drugs falling narrowly outside
statutory restrictions on the sale of dangerous drugs.
34. See CAL.. PENAL CODE § 330 (West Supp. 1986).
35. 9 Op. Att'y. Gen. 108 (1947) (For the purposes of CAL. PENAL CODE § 330, "it is
our conclusion that 'stud-horse poker' is identical with 'stud-poker' "). But see Huntington
Park Club Corp. v. City of Huntington Park, No. C550991, May 1, 1987 (unreported opinion
of Superior Court Judge Vernon G. Foster concluding that "stud-horse poker" is not the
equivalent of "stud poker," meaning that the latter is not prohibited by CAL. PENAL CODE §
330).
36. The California Gaming Registration Act, effective July 1, 1984, gives every city and
county in the state a local option to license commercial card clubs for the playing of games not
prohibited by California Penal Code section 330. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE. §§ 19800-19826
(West 1987).
Several communities have embraced this option to permit large poker casinos. For exam-
ple, Bell Gardens, a small suburb of Los Angeles, has licensed the largest card casino in the
world, The Bicycle Club. The Club has 80,000 square feet of floor space and 120 card tables.
RosE, supra note 1, at 3-4.
37. A California card casino can only provide games that are permitted by state law
and within the scope of the local ordinance authorizing the casino. Consequently, a second set
of questions arises concerning the scope of local licensing provisions.
For example, until this ordinance was changed, the city of Huntington Park permitted
card clubs in which a short, enumerated list of card games could be played. This list included
draw poker, but not hold'em poker. A casino operator seeking to provide facilities for the latter
was forced to argue before a local trial court that hold'em poker is a form of draw poker. The
court rejected this argument (presumably because hold'em involves no "draw" of cards from
the deck) and barred the playing of hold'em poker in Huntington Park card casinos. See RosE,
supra note 1, at 38-39.
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over the status of "Texas hold'em poker" in California. Hold'em
poker is similar to stud poker in the sense that both have no draw
and some cards are dealt face up. However, unlike stud poker, each
player in hold'em is dealt two cards face down and must make up
the remainder of his hand from five community cards dealt face up
at the center of the table. In addition, the rules for betting in the two
games vary.
The legal issue raised by hold'em poker in California is
whether it is a type of stud poker prohibited under the standards
discussed above, or another type of card game falling outside Califor-
nia's specific prohibitions. Surprisingly, in light of their dissimilarity
of play, the California Attorney General's office has issued a memo-
randum concluding that hold'em is a form of stud poker.38 Appar-
ently, the Attorney General considers any version of poker lacking a
draw to be a variety of stud poker and, hence, prohibited. This char-
acterization illustrates the difficulties involved in giving legal mean-
ing to even a commonly used gambling term such as "stud poker."
B. Constitutional Gambling Law - The Limits Of Commercial
Speech
If most gambling law issues were like the California poker con-
troversy, this field would be a colorful but narrow, domain of inter-
est to only a specialized group of lawyers and legal scholars. How-
ever, many gambling law controversies have broader importance,
touching on some of our most important constitutional values.3 9
38. Memorandum from Nancy Sweet, Office of the Attorney General, to Allen Sumner
(Aug. 5, 1983) (analyzing the status of "Five-Card Hold'em" under California law).
39. As an extreme example of the disfavored treatment of gambling under the law, some
courts have questioned whether the rights of gambling concerns and of individuals seeking to
be associated with them are afforded any protection under the federal Constitution. In State v.
Rosenthal, 93 Nev. 36, 559 P.2d 830 (1977), the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the
regulation of gambling is one of the powers reserved to the states under the tenth amendment
to the U.S. Constitution and, hence, is not subject to federal constitutional restrictions. The
court applied this notion solely to deny constitutional limitations on initial applications for a
gambling license; once a license has been obtained the court felt that a property right was
created that could only be extinguished through procedures that met constitutional require-
ments. See id. The Federal Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reached a similar conclusion
regarding the constitutional rights of persons seeking greyhound racing licenses under New
Hampshire law. See Medina v. Rudman, 545 F.2d 244 (1st. Cir. 1976).
At least one federal court has expressly rejected the conclusion of the Rosenthal court that
gambling regulation operates outside of federal constitutional constraints. See United States v.
Goldfarb, 464 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Mich. 1979). In addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court
has implicitly rejected this notion by testing the validity of various aspects of New Jersey
casino regulation under traditional constitutional standards. See, e.g., In re Martin, 90 N.J.
295, 447 A.2d 1290 (1982); Bally Mfg. Corp. v. N.J. Casino Control Comm'n., 85 N.J. 325,
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Rose has identified one such problem in the controversy sur-
rounding first amendment protections of gambling advertising. Cit-
ing federal laws that expressly prohibit broadcast advertising of pri-
vately operated lotteries, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has informally told local stations that it views all forms of
gambling as equivalent to lotteries and thus not a proper subject of
broadcast advertising. Therefore, radio and television stations run
advertisements of legal gambling activities (other than state lotteries)
at the risk of losing their broadcasting licenses.
The ability of the FCC or the U.S. Congress to impose this
advertising limitation without running afoul of first amendment con-
straints is unclear. The Supreme Court recently upheld a similar
prohibition on gambling advertising enacted by the Puerto Rico Leg-
islature."' The Court reasoned that since the legislature could have
prohibited gambling altogether, it could also take less drastic steps
like prohibiting advertising to restrict the prevalence of gambling."'
However, where the body prohibiting advertising is not a state or
territorial government with direct police power over gambling, but is
rather a federal agency like the FCC, it remains unclear how this
rationale will apply.
Earlier Supreme Court opinions dealing with commercial
speech suggest that actions like the FCC's, aimed at the paternalistic
protection of listeners through advertising bans, will not be upheld
since governments may not "completely suppress the dissemination
of admittedly truthful information about entirely lawful activity [out
of fear concerning] that information's effect upon its disseminators
and its recipients."4 Under this broader notion of protected commer-
cial speech, legally operated gambling establishments (e.g., licensed
casinos, card clubs, or Indian bingo parlors) would appear to have a
constitutional right to advertise on American airwaves. The success
of gambling concerns in gaining recognition of this right willhelp
determine the breadth of commercial speech protections applicable to
other similarly regulated or specially disfavored industries.4
426 A.2d 1000 (1981).
40. See Posadas, 106 S. Ct. 296.
41. Id.
42. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 773 (1976); see also Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
43. Cigarette manufacturers and retailers form another disfavored industry subject to a
total broadcast advertising ban. The constitutionality of this total ban, like that on the advertis-
ing of legal gambling enterprises, is unclear. For an analysis of the commercial speech protec-
tions afforded cigarette advertising, see Welkowitz, Smoke in the Air: Commercial Speech and
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C. Federalism Issues In The Control Of Gambling
Federalism limitations on state control of Indian bingo parlors
illustrate yet another unusual legal problem raised by gambling. An
odd combination of state and federal restrictions currently govern
these parlors. To promote uniform application of criminal standards,
Congress has granted a number of states criminal jurisdiction over
federal Indian reservations." Thus, California, one of the affected
states, can totally prohibit particular forms of gambling on Indian
reservations in that state.4
However, the Supreme Court has ruled that once a state legal-
izes a type of gambling, further state law limitations on how the
game can be played or on how large the game stakes can be are
components of civil law and therefore not controlling on federal
lands.41 Consequently, in states such as California that have legal-
ized bingo for charitable organizations,4 commercial bingo parlors
opened on Indian reservations are subject to no state restriction.4 8
Largely as a result of this gap in state regulation, commercial
bingo parlors are now operated on Indian reservations in California,
Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, Florida, and Washington.'
Many of these parlors are enormous. In one North Carolina bingo
parlor, for example, prizes include a $50,000 jackpot and an $18,000
Cadillac. The Seminole Tribe in Florida grossed $20 million in 1982
from their bingo parlor, producing a $2.7 million profit.'0
D. The Conflicts Law of Gambling
Other gambling law controversies hinge on interstate disparities
in the treatment of gambling. One such controversy concerns the
conflict of law rules applicable to gambling debts. This issue arises
where legally incurred gambling debts are sought to be enforced in
Broadcasting, 7 CARDOzo L. REv. 47 (1985).
44. Extension of state criminal jurisdiction to Indian reservations was granted by Con-
gress in 1953 for the six states with the largest Indian populations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1984 & Supp. 1 1987).
45. See, e.g., CAl,. PENAL CODE § 330 (West 1985) (prohibiting the playing of an enu-
merated list of games).
46. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987).
47. Bingo games operated by charitable organizations are authorized by California's
constitution, CA.. CONS'r. art. IV, § 19(c); however, the amounts that charities can offer as
bingo prizes are limited by statute, CA.. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (West Supp. 1986).
48. The freedom of Indian bingo parlors from California state law restrictions was rec-
ognized in Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987).
49. See RosE, supra note 1, at 210.
50. Id.
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states where gambling is illegal.
Under normal conflicts principles, the laws of a state in which a
valid debt is incurred and is to be repaid will generally be applied to
determine the enforceability of the debt in a court of a remote state. 5'
Yet, many state courts refuse to enforce obligations to pay gambling
debts legally incurred out of state.52 They reach this result by apply-
ing a public policy exception to the normal conflicts rules regarding
contracts - i.e. the rarely applied notion that a state need not apply
the contract laws of a remote state where to do so would offend the
public policy of the state where enforcement is sought.53
In recent years, however, as limited forms of gambling have
been legalized in many states, the scope of state public policies
against gambling have come into question. Does the adoption of a
state lottery imply that gambling is no longer against public policy,
making out of state casino debts enforceable? Some courts have an-
swered affirmatively;54 others have concluded that non-authorized
forms of gambling are still against public policy and that related
gambling debts should remain unenforceable." The difficulty and
51. Under the conflicts rules of most states, the law applied to a contract issue (in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties) is that of the state having the most signifi-
cant contacts with the issue. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1980 &
Supp. 1986). Assuming that a player receives an extension of credit to facilitate gambling in a
state where gambling is legal and agrees to pay back the debt there as well, that state would
have the greatest contacts with the resulting debt contract. See id. at § 195. Thus, under
normal conflicts principles, the law of the state where the gambling occurs would be applied
when enforcement of gambling-related debts is sought in the courts of a remote state.
52. See, e.g., Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. Jernigan, 202 So. 2d 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); Resorts Int'l. Hotel, Inc. v. Agresta, 569 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 725
F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1984). See generally 71 A.L.R. 3d 171 (1973).
53. See H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 198-202 (1969); R. WEIN-
TRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 82-86 (1980).
54. For example, such a change in public policy toward gambling was recognized by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Caribe Hilton Hotel v. Toland, 63 N.J. 301, 307 A.2d 85
(1973). There, the court was asked to enforce gambling debts incurred by the defendant in a
Puerto Rico casino, despite the fact that casino gambling was not then legal in New Jersey. It
viewed the essential question in the case as being, "[s]hould New Jersey any longer remain a
privileged sanctuary for those who would play but not pay?" Id. The court considered the
changing gambling laws of the state and concluded that "'[the fact that wagering in various
different ways is now authorized demonstratels] that our public policy no longer can be said to
condemn gambling per se." Id. Since it felt that there was no longer any public policy against
gambling, the court applied normal conflicts principles and recognized the enforceability of the
defendant's gambling debts. Id.
55. See, e.g., Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 202 So. 2d at 831 ("[Tlhe public policy of the
State of Florida is well established that the State will condone certain selected forms of gam-
bling, but it has likewise been established that the state will not lend its judicial arm to the
collection of monies wagered in such enterprises not authorized by the law of the State of
Florida.").
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unpredictability of the answers to such questions demonstrates the
confusion that can stem from constantly changing public policy limi-
tations on conflict rules.
E. Gambling Law As A Regulatory Laboratory
Gambling law is a worthwhile subject for general study because
it serves as a testing ground for new regulatory techniques. Because
gambling industry regulation typically involves broad powers to set
qualifications for entry into the industry and to limit the activities of
persons admitted, gambling regulations involve unusually extensive
restrictions on the activities of corporations and individuals in the
gambling field. The effectiveness of these restrictions in preventing
improper casino activities provide a basis for estimating their useful-
ness in other regulatory applications."
As an example of an experimental regulatory measure applied
to gambling activities, the New Jersey Casino Control Commission
currently uses a novel executive disqualification technique to screen
corporations for casino operating licenses. Under New Jersey statu-
tory standards, a corporate applicant is only qualified for a casino
license if it can demonstrate its good character." A corporation's
character is defined as depending, at least in part, on the background
of the firm's top executives." However, where a firm has employed
an unacceptable executive, it is not necessarily disqualified from li-
censure. It is given a second chance if it will disassociate itself from
the objectionable executives. Most of the firms given this option have
taken it, leading to an interesting new form of professional
banishment. 9
The Commission's notion that the mere removal of certain key
executives can immediately transform the values observed in a large
56. New Jersey legislators and regulators have created far more elaborate systems for
licensing and monitoring casino operators than their Nevada counterparts. This is due in part
to New Jersey's more restrictive regulatory goals and in part to its much larger budget for
casino regulation. For a comparison of casino regulation in Nevada and New Jersey, see
RosE, supra note 1, at 178-89.
The greater activity of New Jersey casino regulators means that their efforts constitute a
much more important testing ground for new regulatory techniques than the relatively limited
endeavors of Nevada gaming authorities.
57. See N.J. SrAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-84 (West Supp. 1984).
58. See id. at §§ 5:12-85(c). See generally Michael, Whose License is It Anyway? -
The Evaluation of the Suitability of a Corporation for a Casino License, 6 SETON HALL L.J.
41 (1982).
59. The author has examined this practice and its regulatory implications elsewhere. See
Gruner, Banished from the Boardwalk The Control of Corporate Casino Operators Through
Executive Disqualification, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 759 (1985).
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firm is consistent with decisions in other legal fields treating the re-
sponsibility of a corporation as identical with the responsibility of its
current management. 60 Under this view, a change in executives
works a corresponding change in corporate values and, hence, corpo-
rate character. However, more sophisticated studies of corporate cul-
tures have suggested that firm values and standards become in-
grained and are not necessarily altered by a simple change in a few
executives. 1 The success or failure of the Commission's executive
disqualification practices may not only help resolve this philosophical
controversy, but should also indicate whether executive disqualifica-
tion would be a useful corporate control measure in other settings.
IV. SOME CRITICISMS
Rose's work is not without faults. One of the more serious
problems stems from his attempt to cater to a broad range of readers.
In order to make his work accessible to lay readers, Rose has in-
cluded descriptions of very basic legal subjects such as where case
opinions can be found. Legal specialists will hardly find these
passages revealing.
Fortunately, such rudimentary discussions form only a small
portion of the book. Rose quickly relates these basic passages to more
sophisticated gambling law analyses. These analyses will hold the
attention of lawyers and legal academics alike. They not only serve
as a valuable introduction to the gambling law field, but also offer
many entertaining reinterpretations of familiar legal issues in color-
ful gambling contexts.
Rose's analyses are well researched, conceptually sophisticated,
and described in highly understandable prose. Furthermore, he
brings alive what might have been a very dry subject by keeping in
constant touch with the human element underlying gambling law.
He accomplishes this primarily by recounting the unusual history of
many gambling law controversies.
One wishes that Rose's obviously considerable research was
more easily accessible to the reader. Although supplemented by a
substantial bibliography and descriptions of sources supporting par-
ticular portions of the text, Rose's work has neither an index nor
60. See, e.g., Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Kohl, 59 N.J. 471, 482, 284 A.2d 161 (1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972). For a discussion of the philosophical link between Trap
Rock and New Jersey's corporate casino licensing and executive disqualification practices, see
Michael, supra note 58.
61. See, e.g., C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 228-48 (1975).
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extensive footnotes.
V. CONCLUSION
As aggravating as some of the omissions are, they do not detract
from the essential success of Rose's work. He sets out to introduce
both lay and legal readers to the long neglected field of gambling
law. Rose succeeds remarkably well at both tasks, linking this spe-
cialized and largely unappreciated legal field with the mainstream of
American law.
